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Abstract 
The West claims to be an economic and political power. However, its moral authority seems 
increasingly pilloried in many places. Some political scientists even speak of “Westlessness”: populism, 
nationalism, right-wing extremism, terrorism and democratic fatigue are some of the symptoms. This 
disunity of many people in Western industrialised nations is nowhere more evident than in relation to 
the contested topic of immigration. It polarises societies, as it is precisely here that legal convictions 
clash with ethical and moral ones and subsequently fail in the attempt to create Realpolitik. This article 
will trace the events that led to the neologism “Westlessness” being coined, before it will contextualise 
responses from within and without to this diagnosis and use the EU’s responses to the so-called refugee 
crisis from 2015 until the present as a test case for its future in solidarity and unity. 
Keywords: Westlessness, Western values, EU migration, refugee crisis, illegal immigration Regional  
Introduction 
2020 went down in the annals as a seminal year for the acceleration of historical 
change. As Australian former Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley, noted, 
looking back at the year in politics: “The world we inhabit nowadays has seen many of 
the principles and certainties of the post-World War II international order severely 
challenged” (Beazley, 2021, p. 3). This affects how we conduct foreign policy, how we 
practise soft diplomacy and how we perceive nations and trading blocs, including the 
regard in which people and ideologies are held, among them the so-called “West”.  
Terms such as “the political West” or “the Western project” are notoriously difficult to 
define. For some, the political and legal parameters are central as they think about 
Western liberal democracies: their separation of powers and the autonomy of business 
and science with regard to government, state and religion, as well as democratic 
structures. For others, it is more about ethical and moral categories such as human 
rights, freedom and equality. In 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell, Weede reminded 
his readers: “At the heart of Europe’s success story were the restrictions of state power, 
the rule of law and secure ownership rights” (Weede, 1989). That rule of law came into 
sharp focus in 2020 when the EU’s budget negotiations were in danger of stalling as a 
result of the objections by some member nations to aspects of EU policy, in particular 
regarding fundamental issues such as the separation of powers or journalistic 
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freedoms. Even in many EU member states where the rule of law is less contentious, 
civility was not necessarily guaranteed. 
Before the advent of social media and the internet had created an environment of 
problematic individualism and heightened agitation that spilled from the virtual to the 
real, Weede had warned that in the “culture of narcissism” of late capitalist society, and 
its egotistical behaviour would be considered normal and unavoidable, and this would 
inevitably lead to the gradual dissolution of existing social structures. Has too much 
Western freedom led to the undermining and potential demise of the West? Or have 
responses by world leaders between 2016 and 2020 undermined the idea and ideals of 
“the West”? In this context, former US President Donald Trump’s twittered egotism 
and lack of civility as much as his “equivocal attitude to such linchpins of the western 
alliance system as the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)” come to mind, just as do those of other world leaders, among them “Russian 
President Vladimir Putin’s critique of the ‘liberal idea’ as ‘obsolete’ in June 2019” 
(Schlesinger, 2020, p. 1548).  
Senior German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger has gone so far as to diagnose a resulting 
“Westlessness” in order to identify this problem (Ischinger, 2020). The term is a pun, 
of course, but what does he mean by “Westlessness”? Neither the Oxford nor the 
Macquarie dictionaries have thus far included the term which was coined in 2020 in 
the lead-up to the annual Munich Security Conference (MSC), a gathering of around 
300-500 senior figures from close to 100 countries, chiefly international leaders from 
industry, science, politics, economy, media and defence. As the MSC is mainly 
dedicated to debating current and future security challenges, its motivating sensibility 
is, ergo, angst or a feeling of insecurity. And the term “Westlessness” expressed just 
that: a sense of having lost something or lacking something.  
As Winter and Moir note, crisis has long been “a motive force in European history, 
memory and thought, as well as in reform and revolution as in complexly related 
responses to critical, landmark moments of change” (2019, p. 3), but so far this crisis 
of “Westlessness” seems to have offered an opportunity primarily for others. 
International observers from outside “the West” were quick to put their finger on it: 
According to Chinese observers, such as Wenshan Jia, Adjunct Professor at Shandong 
University, the term bemoans “a loss of cohesion, a loss of a mission and sense of 
direction among the Western countries […] a call for Western countries to overcome 
their internal divisions and make the West more Westful” (Wenshan Jia, 2020); a 
thinly veiled call to unity for the West in its dealings with China, the so-called “Meddle 
Kingdom”, and Russia, “Putemkin’s State”, as the 2020 Munich Security Conference 
Report called them (Ischinger, 2020, pp. 30 and 34 respectively). At the time of its 
intense debate in early 2020, the diagnosis of Westlessness was also “a call for more 
Europeanness and less American Trumpism” (Wenshan Jia, 2020). These Asian 
analysts of the Munich Security Conference contrasted the West’s lack of unified goals 
with their own success stories of alignment and cooperation. South Korean Foreign 
Minister Kang Kyung-wha pointed to ASEAN (Chinese News, 17 February 2020), while 
China engages in its own multilateral Belt and Road initiatives in the Global South, 
even if they come with their own set of impediments and exploitations. So the term and 
responses to it are far from straightforward. 
The aim of this article is twofold; firstly, to contextualise responses to the diagnosis of 





of the European project is complicated from within and without the EU, and secondly, 
to use the EU’s refugee policies from 2015 until the present as a test case for the clash 
between ideal and reality of so-called Western values which will determine the future 
of European integration. 
Westlessness or Westfulness 
The term “Westlessness” seems to be the opposite of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of 
History” thesis which was widely referenced in the 1990s. Then professor of 
international political economy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies, Fukuyama, the author of The End of History and the Last Man 
(1992), touted the triumph of western liberal democracy after the end of the Soviet 
Union and the global communist-capitalist divide. His diagnosis, however polemical 
in intent, was heavily criticised after its first appearance in essay form, before the 
events surrounding 9/11 seemed to deal the final blow. The following month, 
Fukuyama published a rebuttal to his critics in the Wall Street Journal. Not even the 
concluding paragraph has dated well, where Fukuyama asserted: “We remain at the 
end of history because there is only one system that will continue to dominate world 
politics, that of the liberal-democratic West.” (5 October 2001) The hybris expressed 
therein jars for several reasons. 
Both Fukuyama’s and Ischinger’s world views remain rooted in West-centrism. For 
both of them “the West” is at the centre of their perspective and logic, and the phrase 
serves as an antonym to entities such as the East, Russia, China and the Orient. Each 
of these terms, as McNeill described them in his study of the meaning of “the West”, is 
“a function of who says it and for what purpose” (1997, pp. 513-514). Irrespective of the 
purpose, the mere use of the term “the West” and, by implication, its analogue, the 
Global North, gives currency and meaning, albeit different values, to a concept that 
even from within the EU some regard as anachronistic (Executive Vice President of the 
European Commission, Margrethe Vestager, quoted in Carr & Erber, 2020; p. 216).  
The idea of the West as tied to capitalism and development also surfaces in the 
concepts of two other contested expressions used as antonyms of “the West”: the 
Global South or the Third World. Devoid of geographical meaning, these terms have 
not only played their parts as signifiers for a set of global relations of dependence and 
inequality, but also for a worldwide project and an ideological orientation that has long 
encapsulated common values and goals (Stavrianos, 1981, p. 35). Just as Westlessness, 
with its associated crisis of common values (Wertegemeinschaft), loss of leadership 
role (Verlust des westlichen Gestaltungsanspruchs) and general feeling of unease and 
uncanniness, according to Ischinger (2020), was diagnosed as a return to individual or 
national responses to crises (cf. Bunde et al., 2020), the concept of Westlessness was 
contrasted by some politicians and analysts in their accounts of Westfulness. India’s 
Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar used the latter term in recognition of the 
end of an era, the high time of Westfulness, due to the perceived waning of the 
superpower USA, to which others believed to have found their own answers; either 
“more Europe” (Carr & Erber, 2020, p. 216) or “increased cultural and ideational 
diversity” (Reus-Smit, 2018, p. 7) and a new form of “international system consisting 
of several international orders” (Flockhart, 2020, p. 530).  
A perceived waning of the idea and ideal of “the West” has been the subject of laments 
at least since Spengler’s Decline of the West a century ago. Regularly and habitually, 
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academics, politicians, thinkers “have been debating its ‘crisis’, pondering its chances 
of ‘survival’, and considering its ‘suicide’”, as Bavaj points out (2011). One strong 
proponent of the idea that there are dangers in feeling uneasy about a perceived 
“exaggerated mood of Western decline”, as “these gloomy projections rest on 
exaggerations of China’s power and western weakness”, is the author of Do Morals 
Matter? (2020a), Harvard professor Joseph Nye. He refers to a conversation with 
former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in which the latter referred to “the 
ability of America to draw upon the talents of the whole world and recombine them in 
diversity and creativity [in a way] that was not possible for China’s ethnic Han 
nationalism” (Lee Kuan Yew cited in Nye, 2020b). By logical extension, the same holds 
true for the EU, if only it does not close its borders to new arrivals; for strength would 
lie in immigration, so long as it can be controlled. 
Competing narratives of crises and successes 
Over the last decades, the EU has been affected by multiple crises (Fabbrini, 2019). 
Mass migration, globalisation and nationalisation seem to have created, especially 
within Western Europe, ‘winners’ and losers’ (Kriesi et al., 2008), even prior to the 
Global Financial Crisis and its specific European reverberations.  
In the cosmos of political cartoons, Europe has been depicted as a snail and as 
a hydra, as a snake pit or a pigsty. The European Union can be a sick man, an 
old woman in a wheelchair, a neglected child or a sad woman. Europe found 
itself mocked as a deflated balloon, as a race car without an engine, as a derailed 
train, as a sinking ship or as a jumbo jet too big for a runway. The Continent has 
been portrayed as a barren mountain range of EU summits, as a garbage dump 
of files, as a befouled land of plenty with lakes of milk and wine. Europe in 
caricature is a house of cards, a ramshackle home, a burning hut, a crumbling 
temple (Fichtner, 2021, p. 17). 
Even if it is just facing turmoil and not yet perceived to lie in ruins, it seems never far 
from yet another crisis. 
Most recently, Covid 19 exposed further the many difficulties of European integration, 
unity and solidarity; problems with reporting, documenting and responding to virus 
outbreaks and infection clusters; from Austria’s Ischgl to Italy’s Bergamo and from 
sourcing personal protective equipment to producing and distributing vaccines. In 
particular, Brunazzo and Mascitelli have recently pointed to “the disarray and 
uncoordinated response to migration” and “the tragic impact of the Corona virus 
pandemic” (2020, p. 29) as failures of the EU on a grand scale. According to them, all 
of these developments have led to an increase in Euroscepticism among many long-
standing member states, including its founding member Italy, so that “political elites 
could no longer take for granted the EU as a resource around which to mobilise political 
and electoral consensus” (2020, p. 22). As a result, attitudes toward EU integration 
have become more differentiated and Ullrich Fichtner poignantly diagnoses: 
“Financial crises became identity crises and refugee crisis spiralled into existential 
crises” (Fichtner, 2021, p. 17). 
This faltering support for legitimising ideology or the emergence of Westlessness are 
indeed rooted in foundational values of the liberal international order no longer 





the liberal international order”, according to Flockhart, “is not something that happens 
through mere disappointment with policy failure” (2020, p. 521), and has a lot to do 
with failures to celebrate European successes beyond the inner-European freedom of 
movement for people, goods and services. In his essay “How Europe Became a Model 
for the 21st Century”, Ullrich Fichtner, editor-in-Chief with Germany’s highly 
influential and respected magazine Der Spiegel, defiantly points to the EU’s immense 
and unrivalled market power (measured both in total economic output as gross 
domestic product / GDP and GDP per capita), its strong international partnerships 
both in relation to existing and emerging relationships in trade and aid. Foremost, 
however, his argument goes, the EU is setting standards that are, even now, the envy 
of, and the role model for, many:  
Technology companies in California build their devices according to EU 
regulations. Cocoa producers in Ghana and Ecuador are transforming their 
operations to meet European standards. In Argentina, Israel and Russia, 
plaintiffs are suing internet companies and invoking the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
that was formulated in the EU. Regional blocs of countries on South America 
are organizing themselves along the lines of the EU. Laws drafted in Europe are 
adopted almost verbatim into national law in countries around the world. Fast 
food companies […] are taking chemical additives out of their products because 
the EU doesn’t allow them. [….] the composition of the plastic in sneakers 
around the world [was changed] to make less toxic, EU-complaint goods. […] 
Europe’s view of data protection […] has quickly become a global standard that 
no company and no country can ignore (Fichtner, 2021, p. 19). 
Even the London-based weekly magazine, The Economist, had to admit repeatedly that 
today’s globalisation is actually a “Europeanisation”: “Increasingly, globalisation 
resembles Europeanisation.” (The Economist, 8 February 2020). By logical extension, 
Europe, or more precisely the area of the EU, remains the aspirational goal for many 
other players in relation to trade, value setting and as a popular destination for asylum 
seekers and other migrants.  
The ongoing refugee and migration crisis 
Ever since the dissolution of the Old World Order, hundreds of thousands of refugees 
and migrants have taken their chances and set out to find peace and prosperity in 
Europe. Whether their entry point has been along the Black Sea, the Mediterranean 
coast or across mountain ranges in the Balkans, their first EU country of landing was 
rarely the desired final destination. The point of entry, however, became de-facto the 
processing responsibility, leaving the communities, regions and, ultimately countries, 
to deal with medical, administrative and legal challenges involved in registering and 
assessing the newcomers.  
In view of the recent global movement of people, which presents itself on a scale that 
has not been experienced since the end of the Second World War, it has been obvious 
that the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulations proved no longer workable 
(Ludewig, 2017). However, this insight has not led to a new and unified approach with 
the European Union, but provoked unilateral actions by many of its member states, 
ranging from Italy temporarily closing its ports and forcing ships with migrants on 
board to berth in other countries (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020, p. 28) to Hungary 
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forcibly deporting migrants and asylum seekers to Serbia in clear contravention of 
international as well as EU laws (Dunai, 2021).  
If Westlessness is diagnosed as a return to individual or national responses to crises – 
at times wilfully ignoring international laws, conventions and basic human rights – 
than the ongoing refugee and migration crisis in Europe is one of its tests, as it is here 
that classic “western” values of freedom, tolerance, the rule of law etc. are being 
subjected to pressure by populist and increasingly authoritarian interest groups. In this 
environment the supranational cohesion of the EU has increasingly been pressure 
tested and ultimately started to fragment.  
Particularly the countries along Europe’s periphery – which Angela Merkel primarily 
sought to protect with her decision in 2015 not to close Germany’s borders to large 
treks of refugees – have since found it difficult to juggle national with supranational 
priorities as the stream of new arrivals at times ebbs but never stops to flow. Major 
refugee movements in the wake of the social and political upheavals in the Middle East 
and parts of Northern Africa contribute to this just as much as economic migrants and 
those fleeing areas of health concerns. The issues of migration and asylum polarise 
nations and put not just the EU under intense pressure, as legal, ethical and moral 
imperatives clash with economic imperatives and ethno-cultural systems. Ironically, it 
is this indecision and the lack of a unified effort as a powerful bloc that helped create 
in part the current refugee situation in Europe.  
A particular challenge for the “West” has been its relationship with the “Far East” and 
Africa. After the Arab Spring the EU did not follow up on its moral support for the 
emerging democracies with trade deals and a genuine interest in the well-being of the 
local populations. In many cases the West continued to support the dictators whom 
many locals wanted to oust. In late 2020, France’s President Emmanuel Macron even 
bestowed his country’s highest order, the Légion d’honneur, on the Egyptian ruler 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is in some circles referred to as “the butcher of Cairo”. Years 
after the Arab Spring many in the West still either supported the despots that many in 
the region wanted to dispose of, in Egypt, Tunisia, but also Syria, or showed a costly 
indecisiveness: 
It was not the West that intervened in Syria, but Iran and Russia – on the side of the 
regime. In Libya, NATO intervened, but left the country alone after the fall of 
Muammar al-Gaddafi. In Yemen, the West gave free rein to ally Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates when they bombed civilians. This was the real sin of the West 
after 2011: it made itself politically irrelevant in the Middle East. The USA withdrew 
further and further under Barack Obama, Europe left the field to Iran, Russia and 
Turkey. The EU and NATO remained spectators, although Europe has also suffered 
from the chaos in the region to this day: the consequences were the refugee crisis of 
2015, the spread of IS, jihadist tourism by Europeans to Syria and Iraq, and finally the 
attacks by IS terrorists in Paris, Nice and Berlin. The destabilisation of the Middle East 
contributed to the reshuffling of the political landscape in Europe, to the rise of right-
wing populists – and, yes, also to Brexit, for which the fear of migrants was a reason in 
2016. The inability of Europeans to stop the catastrophe in Syria has thus also made 





Indeed, the European refugee crisis, that peaked in 2015/16, continues, not least due 
to the indecisive actions and mixed messages coming from within the EU, outlined 
above.  
The UN continues to report record numbers of people on the move world-wide (around 
80 million) and while numbers are down for 2020 in countries such as Germany, the 
contact zone has shifted from Europe’s geographic centre to the periphery and from 
policy setting to practical (and earlier) intervention. According to Frontex’s annual 
report, the areas of concern are these days on the Balkans, especially in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and in Greece (Frontex, 2021, pp. 16-19). As such, the focus has shifted 
from soft diplomacy to hard border protection on the EU’s outer rim. In doing so, the 
EU has also responded to a unifying sentiment in many member states: the rise of anti-
immigration rhetoric and citizen’s groups forming. As such, the fear of migrants and 
asylum seekers has pushed Britain largely out of the EU but ironically unities many in 
Europe in terms of the right-wing populism that has gripped many parts of the West. 
Anti-migration groups throughout Europe openly condone the at times violent 
behaviour of border guards, working on land and sea, and favour conditions in 
detention centres that are likely to discourage others from arriving, such as those 
situated in parts of Greece and Croatia (Beirich & Via, 2020, p. 12).  
The refugee camp on the Greek Aegean island of Lesbos is a case in point. The 
European Union endeavoured to (re)define its asylum policy by establishing the Mória 
Reception and Identification Centre, also known as the Mória Refugee Camp. It soon 
grew beyond capacity, and makeshift accommodation expanded into nearby olive 
groves. To stem the flow of new arrivals and by way of dealing with further 
overcrowding, the EU struck a deal with Turkey in 2018, building on earlier 
agreements with Turkey which had already been signed as early as 2016. All these 
efforts were designed to control, if not deter, the crossing of refugees and migrants 
from Turkey to Greek islands and hence into the EU, but did little to address the root 
causes or offer long-term solutions. Over the following years, little progress was made, 
while many setbacks were suffered. In 2020 up to 15,000 people resided in the Mória 
Refugee Camp provisionally, until more than half of them were made homeless after a 
fire destroyed accommodation and surroundings. On 5 September 2020, the night of 
the destructive fire, press photographer Angelos Tzortzinis captured an image showing 
a ten year old boy carrying a younger child away from the flames (2020). With this 
photo, Tzortzini took out the UNICEF Photo of the Year award in 2020 and highlighted 
– as only images can do – the sad reality of the EU’s response to its refugee 
management as not extending its foundational values to those most in need.  
In its own press release the EU acknowledged in 2017 that “the arrival of more than 
one million asylum seekers and migrants to Europe in 2015 exposed serious flaws in 
the EU’s asylum system.” In response the EU Parliament “has been working on 
proposals to create a fairer, more effective European asylum policy” (EU Parliament, 
2017). Years later, the EU could still report little progress, admitting freely: “There are 
gaps and shortcomings in the EU’s policy on returning migrants, MEPs say in a 
resolution on the implementation of the Return Directive, which sets out common 
rules for the return of non-EU nationals who do not have the right to stay in the 
European Union.” (EU Parliament, 2020). 
Indeed, the efforts the EU has undertaken over the first decades of the 21st century were 
primarily aiming to “control irregular immigration” with the help of Frontex (2021) 
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which has become the European Union’s fastest growing agency. The agency’s budget 
has grown from just over 6 million Euros in 2005 to over 460 million Euros in 2020. 
By 2027, Europe’s tax payers will have funded Frontex to the tune of 5.6 billion Euros 
(Christides et al., 2021, p. 75). According to its mission statement and 2020 annual 
report, this is pursued by focusing on shutting down routes by fortifying borders and 
stepping up the use of detection technology from surveillance planes and drones to 
satellites. Its activities also involve making an example of trespassers by criminalising 
their conduct and detaining them. Moreover, refugees and migrants in Greece and 
Libya trying to reach western Europe have accused EU border protection agency 
Frontex of taking part in illegal deportations known as ‘pushbacks’ (Schmitz & Seferi, 
2021), actions since then confirmed and exposed as illegal. Unabatingly, Frontex plans 
to deploy up to 10,000 border guard to the EU’s external borders over the coming 
years, where they will work together with national security forces. The establishment 
of the standing corps is one of the EU’s most important migration policies and the 
occasionally ruthless methods employed by Frontex to deter and hinder asylum 
seekers from crossing into the EU are likely to even please and appease many in its 
member states, according to Giulia Lagana, a migration policy expert with the Open 
Society European Policy Institute (Lagana quoted in Christides et al., 2021, p. 78).  
International laws in relation to human rights guarantee the right to asylum for anyone 
seeking protection from political or religious persecution. Refugees’ claims are 
assessed with a view to asylum being refused or granted, either temporarily or 
permanently. These international human rights standards have been accepted by all 
EU member states. Yet the principles agreed to under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, have not prevented many 
member states from interpreting their obligations differently. This was particularly 
obvious when the so-called Visegrád Group (also referred to as V4; namely the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, cf. Ivanova, 2016 and press release from 
2020, visegrád_group.eu) rejected mandatory quotas for all EU member states 
relating to their intake of migrants and refugees awaiting their hearings in Greece and 
Italy. This refusal to share burdens within the EU exposed the absence of a common 
approach as much as a disregard for common values.1 
Another development that highlights the double standards and lack of values 
damaging the West’s international standing relate to the – at times aggressive – 
rhetoric against “illegal” refugees, by which in popular parlance those persons are 
branded, who in the main have left Africa or the Middle East as economic migrants. At 
the same time, EU member states such as Malta, Cyprus and Bulgaria have sold at a 
premium their passports, and thus EU citizenship, to foreigners seeking safer havens 
for their wealth and prosperity (Hornig, 2020, pp. 98-99). This creates effectively two 
categories of economic refugees, those with the means to buy themselves into the EU 
and those who have to rely on the asylum system, irrespective of how broken the latter 
may appear. In an attempt at stopping the sale of so-called “Golden Passports” which 
for Malta alone yields an income of 1.4 billion Euros per annum, then President of the 
European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reiterated that: “European values are 
not up for sale” (September 2020). However, consultancies and agents continue to 
promise that, for example, Euro 900,000 will buy anyone Maltese citizenship, granting 
 
1 Divergence between the Visegrád Group and the EU started with the 2014 Ukrainian crisis (cf. López-





travel permission without visa requirements to 180 countries, and would thus be a 
passport nearly as good as a German one (Hornig, 2020, p. 99). Just like people 
smugglers it is a business model selling hope and an image of a “Golden West’ that may 
not exist for much longer. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, the West still remains an economic and political power, but its moral 
authority seems increasingly pilloried in many places. Part of the problem may be the 
EU’s failure to inspire with its success stories. Anu Bradford, professor at New York’s 
Columbia Law School and author of The Brussels Effect: How the European Union 
Rules the World (2020) points towards the EU’s relative soft and quiet approach to 
power and international relations as its recipe for success. Ironically, it may be at times 
too quiet about its direct and indirect positive influences. As Joseph Nye reflects on his 
distinction between soft and hard power, he points towards the necessity for “smart 
power” in order to bridge and overcome shortcomings of current strategies (2008).  
The term “Westlessness” was coined to identify this gap between ideal and reality of 
the West in the contemporary environment of crises, and this term has proven 
resilient. Following a liberal interpretation of the Schengen Agreement that was not 
supported by all the Union’s members, German Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to 
close Germany’s borders in 2015 when faced with the arrival of hundreds of thousands 
of migrants. Her response to this humanitarian crisis made shortfalls in EU policies 
abundantly apparent. More importantly for our theme, it rendered the underlying 
Westlessness clear: this was not merely a failure in institutional and/or bureaucratic 
operations: it opened up a gap between loosely held ideals and political realities at the 
grass-roots level of the West. The ensuing encounters with refugees and illegal 
migrants have become a litmus test for core values of the West, as much as the 
European Union.  
Not least, the unabated popularity of the EU with asylum seekers and migrants should 
remind us that outsiders appreciate and clearly see hope, successes and something to 
aspire to in the area and in relation to the values of “the West”, something which many 
from within the West and the EU have failed or forgotten to fully appreciate. The EU 
is still perceived as a vehicle for prosperity and a guarantor for peace and stability by 
many in the world based on its achievements; achievements lost from sight by those 
who have come accustomed to taking them for granted, often from within.  
The EU’s goals have been defined most recently again: “Preserving peace, saving the 
world’s climate, ending the destruction of nature, protecting people, increasing 
prosperity, improving lives, seeking happiness. According to one critic: “Most 
Europeans believe these goals are so self-evident that they barely even hear them” 
(Fichtner, 2021, p. 21). Fichtner continues: “As such, they are in danger of failing to 
see” that the EU has been “successful in transforming an entire Continent – a place 
where people tore each other up for centuries – into a model for the 21st century.” 
(2021, p. 21) This echoes Merkel’s controversial claim “Wir schaffen das!” (“We can 
manage this!”), a credo German Turkey correspondent Popp sees as paradigmatic for 
the West, when he reiterated: “That [this “yes, we can do” attitude] is the spirit of the 
West, a good, humanistic, optimistic spirit” (Popp, 2020). That seems not or no longer 
to be the case now in many parts of Europe. The “Westlessness” of populism, neo-
nationalism, right-wing extremism and democratic fatigue appears to be ongoing. 
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To China and Russia, now presenting the most serious threats to Western power since 
the Soviet Union, recent developments such as the refugee crises must feel like a 
strategic gift. The woes of the EU, its inability to formulate a common foreign policy, 
let alone a common strategic position and migration policy, was and continues to be a 
void for others to fill. Essentially, the EU’s lack of collective action as many of its 
member states dwell on narrowly-defined national interests, is a gift to others, yet not 
to the global refugees. As Nye is never weary of stressing, “allies, friendships and 
legitimacy [are] the greatest assets the West has” (Nye, 2020b), and reminding oneself 
of these assets and values might help overcome a loss of confidence.  
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